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Edward (2015) asks the reader if  we are correctly modeling and 
measuring choosiness and preference functions—response curves 
that give the probability (y axis) that a focal individual will mate 
with a potential mate with a given phenotype (x axis). We agree 
that thinking about potential pitfalls is worthwhile. We would, how-
ever, like to offer some counterpoints that reflect our view that his 
concerns, while often technically correct, lead to headaches that 
abate if  one swallows a dose of  biological pragmatism.
First, Edward (2015) notes that choosy individuals need not have 
a lower mating rate than nonchoosy ones: nonchoosers might be 
generally less responsive so that their preference functions are not 
only flat but also vertically displaced downward relative to that of  
choosy individuals. This is possible, but when formulating a null 
hypothesis, it is a strange to assume that responsiveness covaries with 
the shape of  preference functions. We consider it more biologically 
meaningful to remember that active mate choice typically involves 
rejecting some prospective mates. This lowers the mating rate rela-
tive to that were the same individual to mate indiscriminately (e.g., 
Johnstone et  al. 1996). Indirect mate choice (Wiley and Poston 
1996), not mentioned by Edward, offers the best counter examples 
to the above rule: consider “hilltopping” where females indirectly 
choose males by going to a specific location to mate. By travelling 
to a hilltop they might minimize their own time to mating. Even 
so, the fact that mate choice usually lowers the mating rate remains 
true—especially for species used in standard two-choice mating 
experiments (i.e., species where mate rejection occurs).
Second, many of  Edward’s technical arguments rely on the com-
plete absence of  mate assessment by nonchoosy individuals. This is 
ultimately untenable. The need to distinguish between inanimate 
and animate objects, between predators and conspecifics, and so 
on, mean that all animals that mate engage in mate assessment (i.e., 
have a minimum threshold). Otherwise they would spontaneously 
mate “at random” with the world. This is not to say that mistakes 
are not made—witness male beetles in Western Australia attempt-
ing to copulate with discarded beer bottles (Gwynne and Rentz 
1983). One can fret about the appropriateness of  equating a very 
low mating threshold with being nonchoosy, but excessive worrying 
is cured by pragmatically defining a frame of  reference. If  every (or 
almost every) member of  the opposite sex is above an individual’s 
mating threshold, it is sensible to describe him/her as being non-
choosy. The abstraction of  potential mates that do not, but could in 
principle, exist is unhelpful.
Individuals can mate rarely despite being nonchoosy, but the 
opposite is unlikely: it is difficult to be very choosy and still mate as 
often as a promiscuous nonchoosy individual (Kokko and Mappes 
2013). This important asymmetry makes the nonguaranteed nature 
of  mating rate reductions experienced by choosy individuals less 
troublesome in practice than in Edward’s account. We confess to 
fondness for the notion that costs of  choosiness usually manifest as 
a lower mating rate because many theoreticians, ourselves included, 
make predictions based on it. This is why, for example, theory pre-
dicts that (a) females are usually choosier than males (here mate 
availability differences mainly arise from sex differences in paren-
tal investment) (e.g., Johnstone et al. 1996) and (b) two-choice mat-
ing experiments can reveal choosiness that might be completely, 
and adaptively, absent in no-choice tests (Barry and Kokko 2010). 
This brings us to Dougherty and Shuker (2015), who investigated 
support for (a) and (b) with a meta-analysis of  experimental mate 
choice studies. Only the latter prediction was supported. Why?
We can think of  a few reasons, but we focus on a key one: the 
analysis did not involve paired comparisons. Studies of  males 
involve a different set of  species than those of  females. It seems 
likely that researchers conduct male choice studies on species where 
there is at least circumstantial evidence that males are choosy. This 
will inflate the estimated mean strength of  male mate choice com-
pared with that from a truly random sample of  species. Similar 
selective testing is likely to occur for studies of  female choice, but the 
bias is magnified for males if, as theory predicts, the true proportion 
of  species where mate choice is weak or absent is higher for males 
than females. Extrapolating from a meta-analysis to the broader 
context requires care if  there is a strong research bias (Jennions et al. 
2013). In a thought experiment, we might ask “Do mammals fly?” 
The more nonwinged species in our sample, the smaller the effect 
size until the answer is statistically “no.” In this thought experi-
ment, it is easy to identify the problem: the presence or absence of  
wings should have been included as an important modifier variable. 
Unfortunately, the source of  real-world variation among species for 
biologically intriguing questions is usually far less clear.
The theoretical prediction (b) was confirmed. Is the matter settled 
for this one question at least? We believe that intriguing issues still 
remain. Biases might confound the comparison between choice and 
no-choice experimental designs as these designs often use different 
criteria for choice (e.g., association time vs. latency to mate). Also, 
with a choice design, if  neither potential mate was chosen, then a 
trial is discarded as the test subject was sexually unresponsive rather 
than classified as rejection of  both mates. In contrast, in a no-choice 
design, the failure to mate (or a pitiful performance for the behavioral 
proxy of  mating) is often treated as mate rejection. Consequently, 
no-choice designs are systematically biased toward including data 
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from nonsexually responsive individuals, which underestimates the 
strength of  sexual selection. It is therefore worth confirming that the 
difference between the 2 study designs persists if  the meta-analysis is 
confined to no-choice studies that ensured test subjects were sexually 
receptive.
Finally, a no-choice design is a good proxy for a natural situation 
in which prospective mates are encountered sequentially, but two-
choice designs are often a major simplification for species that often 
encounter numerous prospective mates simultaneously (e.g., fiddler 
crabs, chorusing frogs and insects, lekking birds, and mammals). 
Given that experimental data suggest that the number of  mates can 
affect mate choice decisions (Hutchinson 2005), we are unlikely to 
run out of  intriguing study questions any time soon.
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To the uninitiated, “mate choice” may sound like a simple concept, 
but 2 articles in the current issue of  Behavioral Ecology show that it is, in 
fact, quite multidimensional. Although the pair of  articles by Edward 
(2015) and Dougherty and Shuker (2015) bring us greater understand-
ing of  many points, they also reveal much that still remains obscured.
Edward (2015) points out that behavioral ecologists use inconsis-
tent language to describe key components of  mate choice. Although 
he does not attempt the Sisyphean task of  standardizing the diverse 
vocabulary in the previous literature (although he does begin this 
endeavor in an illustrative table), he makes great strides in starting 
what we hope will be a dialogue about the ideal usage of  terms 
describing mate choice. Two components of  mate choice whose 
properties merit further exploration, for example, are mating rate 
and acceptance thresholds. Edward makes the important point 
that mating rate should be constrained by the presence of  potential 
mates; in particular, he argues that when a species uses an accep-
tance threshold, mating rate will change as the threshold shifts (e.g., 
Edward’s Fig. 1j). If  all else is equal, however, it seems that a shift 
in any preference function (i.e., not just a threshold function) that 
reduces overlap with the distribution of  available mates should also 
lead to a change in mating rate (e.g., including when there is a nor-
mally distributed function such as in Edward’s Fig. 1m). Additionally, 
several unique properties attributed to acceptance thresholds seem 
to be consequences of  the fact that the threshold marks a change 
(whether as a step function or as a sigmoid) from absolute rejection 
to absolute acceptance. But why cannot thresholds instead demark a 
change between a low and high probability of  acceptance, rather than 
just 0 or 1? If  this were the case, we can imagine that mating rate 
may be under independent control and fixed; a shift in the threshold 
(i.e. horizontal in Edward’s Fig. 1) could then be compensated by a 
corresponding change in the relative probabilities of  acceptance on 
either side of  the threshold (i.e. vertical in Edward’s Fig. 1).
While stressing the importance of  vocabulary, Edward implicitly 
cautions theorists not to sweep consideration of  the many components 
of  mate choice under the rug. Although we agree that theoreticians 
must be very careful in their assumptions, we counter that many of  
these details may not, in fact, make a difference to a model’s conclu-
sions. If  there is a good reason to believe this is the case, it would be a 
mistake to dismiss models that do not make unnecessarily complicating 
assumptions. The purpose of  models is to isolate the effects of  certain 
factors by placing them in as simplified a context as possible.
The central point made by Dougherty and Shuker (2015) is also 
an important one; the type of  choice trial that researchers use can 
influence the strength of  their measured effects. We applaud their 
careful meta-analytic methodology and their tests for phylogenetic 
effects and publication bias. They find that the effect size for prefer-
ence was significantly stronger when choice tests were used instead 
of  a no-choice paradigm. The 2 plausible explanations that they 
provide (cognitive constraints and opportunity costs) dovetail with 
one of  the most important take-aways from this article; those of  us 
interested in mate choice studies must consider the natural history 
of  the organism in order to design the appropriate choice test.
Using a meta-analytic conversion, Dougherty and Shuker com-
pare the strengths of  preference not only between choice and no-
choice tests but also between preferences in males and females and 
between choices that are intrapopulation, interpopulation, and 
interspecies (within choice and no-choice tests). They obtain the 
puzzling findings that there are no statistical differences in these 
latter two comparisons. These results are clear departures from 
the expectations that female choice should be stronger than male 
choice (because, on average, females are the choosier sex) and that 
preferences across versus within a species should differ more than 
preferences solely within a species. Although the authors caution 
readers against overinterpretation based partly on small sample 
sizes, the results nonetheless require explanation and potentially 
suggest biases that may have been overlooked. The discussion closes 
with proscriptions that we support; experimental research on mate 
choice should assess the strength of  preference under both choice 
and no choice paradigms, whenever possible, using the same sub-
jects for both to control for individual effects.
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